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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the reign of Francis I, the search for supremacy in the European sphere, the attainment of safe borders, and, since the conquest of Algeria, the construction of a colonial empire, have constituted the axes of France’s foreign 
policy.  Nonetheless, the country has repeatedly failed in its attempts to reach the first 
objective, as the experiences of Francis I, Louis XIII, Louis XIV and Napoleon show. 
The attainment of safe borders had incomplete success:  even though the border with 
Spain was stabilized in 1659, it failed in the border with Germany, as the invasions of 
1870, 1914, and 1940 would reveal.
The French victory in the First World War paid such a high human and material 
price that it sunk the country into a moral and social crisis that would last until the 
German aggression in 1940. In 1945, France rose again among the victors, but its role 
as a power had been seriously eroded due to the minor role played by the French 
armed forces in the war and liberation of its own territory.
Perhaps weakness in the immediate aftermath of the World War can explain the 
French obstinacy to retain the two jewels of its colonial empire, Indochina and Algeria. 
The French determination in Indochina led to a war that continued until its defeat 
in the battle of Diên Biên Phu (1954).  Despite suffering a failure of such dimensions, 
Paris repeated the experience in Algeria, until its withdrawal in 1962.
In any case, these failures forced Paris to reconsider its position in the world, its 
relations with the territories in its colonial empire (particularly with those in French-
speaking Africa), its situation regarding NATO, and the scope of its role as a power.
Starting with this situation, this paper will review the configuration of contemporary 
French defense. Assuming that the defense policy is the dimension of national security 
responsible for establishing the aims, determining the objectives, and providing the 
necessary means for defense, the article will analyze the evolution of defense since the 
Cold War until the present. To do so, after presenting the French strategic conception 
during the bipolar world, the White Papers elaborated to adapt its national defense 
policy and its military organization to the changing domestic and international 
situation will be studied, and, taken as a whole, they show the deep transformations 
their defensive architecture has experienced in the last decades.
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2. FRANCE DURING THE COLD WAR
The defense policy during the Cold War was divided into two long periods:  1945-56 
and 1957-89, with the Suez Canal crisis as a pivot. After its inclusion in the Atlantic 
axis with the signing the Treaties of Brussels (1948), and Washington (1949), and its 
impulse into the failed Defense European Community (1952), the allied reluctance to 
expand the operational area included in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty , the 
North American rejection of the French proposal to create a tripartite council together 
with the United States and Great Britain, or the Suez events had a great impact on 
the French strategic conception in the bipolar world. Since then, the Elysée Palace 
focused on consolidating its foreign autonomy through a progressive separation from 
the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States.1 In 1958, the Mediterranean fleet 
left the allied command structure, and the presence of American nuclear weapons 
was banned in French territory. A year later, Paris detonated the first atom bomb, and 
approved the first Military Programme Law (1960-64)2 to acquire the necessary tools to 
guarantee its strategic autonomy, and, finally, in 1966, it abandoned the allied military 
structure.3
It is in this context that the wager on its own nuclear power should be understood; 
an objective on which they were already working since the approval of the first 
nuclear plan in 1952, but that would be reinforced in 1954 with the creation of the 
Commissariat for Atomic Energy dedicated to military applications for the atom, and 
that would obtain practical results in 1960 with the first successful military test.  In 
fact, throughout the sixties, a well-known and continued effort in the field of nuclear 
weapons was boosted, which ended up absorbing a significant part of the resources 
allocated to the purchase of materiel and equipment for the armed forces.
1  DUBURG, Robert, “L’évolution de la politique de défense et la stratégie militaire générale de la 
France”,(«The evolution of the defense policy and the general military strategy in France ») in PASCALON, 
Pierre (dir.): Les armées françaises à l’aube du XXI siècle: L’Armée de Terre, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003, pp. 
53-66.
2   National Assembly, Program Law nº 60-1305 of 8 December 1960 regarding specific military equipment, 
París: Documentation Française, 1960.
3  Nonetheless, by virtue of the Valentin-Ferber (1974) and Biard-Schulze (1978) confidential accords, 
France was participating in the allied contingency plans (in fact, the First French Army participated 
in the counter-offensives of the projecting of the Fulda and the Danube), and in case of war, would 
coordinate its conventional air attacks, and would allow NATO to use its air space (RUIZ-PALMER, 
Diego; “The NATO-Warsaw Pact Competition in the 1970s and 1980s: a Revolution in Military 
Affairs in the Making or the End of a Strategic Age?”, Cold War History, vol. 14, nº 4, 2014, pp. 533-
573).
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The construction of a nuclear force was conceived as a very relevant priority, since 
nuclear capacity was not only one of the cornerstones of French exceptionality, but 
was also fully independent from the outside. In contrast to the United Kingdom, 
whose missile-launching submarines used American vectors and depended on the 
consent of the President of the United States for their use,4 in France, nuclear weapons, 
its launching missiles and associated equipment were designed and manufactured 
domestically.
The first step of the reorganization of the French defense took place in 1959, with the 
approval of the Ordinance for the General Organization of the Defense, which meant 
updating the regulations that dated from the period between wars.5 The document 
required the distribution of competences among the Cabinet of Ministers, the Prime 
Minister, and the Ministry of Defense.6
Nonetheless, in spite of the modernizing effort of the armed forces and the 
launching of a deterrent nuclear capacity of their own, codified in subsequent Military 
Programme Laws for the periods of 1965-70, and 1971-75,7 there was no strategic 
conception defined to sustain the defense policy being put into practice since the 
end of the war of Algeria. It was necessary to wait until 1972 –during the presidency 
of Georges Pompidou– for the first explicit formulation of the principles, objectives, 
capacities, and means of French defense to see the light with the publication of the 
first White Paper on Defense and Security.8
This roadmap recognized that the defense policy was the tool needed to guarantee 
the continued independence of the country and the nationalistic feeling of its 
population.9 Drafted surrounded by the rejection to the policy of aligned blocs, and 
4  By virtue of the accords for the acquisition of the Polaris and Trident missiles, the British doctrine 
of usage was based on nuclear interdependence, understood as the joint planning between the 
United Kingdom and NATO, to select objectives and the British option of unilateral use  in case 
of national emergency.  Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the choice of objectives for its 
strategic bombers was a national prerogative, the same as the eventual use of tactical nuclear devices 
as multiplier of the conventional capabilities. (TETRAIS, Bruno, A comparison between US, UK and 
French nuclear policies and doctrines, París, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 2007.
5  Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Ordinance nº 59-147 of 7 January 1959 including  the general 
organization for the Defense. Paris: Documentation Française, 1959.
6  DUBURG, op. cit., pp. 59-64.
7  National Assembly. Programme Law nº 64-1270 of 23 December 1964 regarding certain military 
equipment, París: Documentation Française, 1964 and Programme Law n° 70-1058 of 19 November 1970 
regarding military equipment of the period 1971 to 1975, París: Documentation Française, 1971.
8  Ministry of Defense, White Paper on National Defense 1972, París: Documentation Française, 1972.
9  There are authors who consider that the basic design of defense was the work of the govenment 
of De Gaulle, and that the White Paper was limited to updating and sistematizing the Gaullist 
inheritance.(LESPINOIS, Jérôme, “The Army: from one White Paper to another”, in PASCALON, op. 
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the non-alignment of the country, the precise definition for foreign commitments 
and the effort of international collaboration in favor of a détente, the roadmap 
had the following priorities: security of the French territory and its population, the 
participation in the security of Europe, security and defense of the Mediterranean 
front, and the compliance of the commitments with the countries in French-speaking 
Africa. The attainment of these objectives demanded a conventional force capable of 
delaying an atomic escalation, and a national nuclear force as last guarantor of the 
integrity of the country.
The equipment of the armed forces was an area reserved for domestic industry 
because the government linked the definition of the needs of the arms industry with 
the industrial policy to satisfy their requirements, with the aim of guaranteeing the 
autonomy of the military industry, avoid the dependence on foreign suppliers, and 
boost the scientific-technological advance, economic development, and territorial 
balance of the country.
The achievement of these objectives was based on planning and programming. 
As for planning, needs were assessed with a time horizon of fifteen years, including 
setting the objectives, the steps to reach them, and the required measurements. 
The programming was done within a framework of five years through the Military 
Programming Laws, which had been submitted to the National Assembly since 1960, 
and included the objectives for equipment, and the budget forecast.
The White Paper supported a global outlook for the security and defense of 
France.  The definition of the defense policy, the description of the main weapons 
programs, the evaluation of the future needs of materiel and equipment, the analysis 
of the validity of compulsory military service, the budget demands, the industrial 
policy of the defense sector, the organization of the armed forces, the education of 
the commanding officers, and the scientific and technological research within the 
scope of defense provided a very complete and comprehensive trajectory for all the 
pieces which, conveniently gathered, justified the why and wherefore of the defense 
of France. Consequently, its publication established the basis of what has been until 
now a demand for all governments, regarding transparency in the elaboration and 
management of the French strategy, and its defense and security policy was laid with 
its publication.
Nonetheless, in subsequent years, significant changes were implemented in the 
defense policy, as a result of the provisions stated in the White Paper, but also due to 
government decisions in response to the events in the international scenario, and to 
the changes in the defensive needs of the country.
cit., pp. 67-90).
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The first noteworthy change took place as a result of the arrival of Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing at the Elysée Palace in 1974. The new government had the perception that 
France’s defense had been weakened, and lacked the autonomous capacity for foreign 
intervention. Thus, a reform process in the ground forces was initiated, based on 
the reduction of troops, the unification of the territorial and operational command 
structures, the restructure of the army corps, and the reinforcement of its logistic 
support, the reduction of the size of the divisions, and the creation of the first helicopter 
combat regiments. Likewise, the defense budget was increased, the modernization of 
weapons was continued and, consistent with the program objectives of the government, 
foreign interventions were increased (Congo, Chad, Mauritania, or Lebanon).
The Socialist victory in 1981 and the investiture of François Mitterrand started the 
gradual deterioration of the capabilities of the armed forces, especially of the Army, 
due to budget cut-backs included in the Military Programme Law (1984-88),10 with new 
reductions of troops and units, and the interruption of the modernization process.11 
This deterioration occurred because the governments in the eighties placed emphasis 
on the idea that the advances in détente, the weakness of some European Communist 
regimes, and the reforms in the Soviet Union were easing international tensions 
and permitted the reduction of France’s defensive capacity, without endangering 
the security of the country. However, the feasibility of this policy was based on the 
fact that Washington, with the support of London, had substantially increased its 
military expenditure, and was forcing Moscow to launch an arms race, which finally 
led to its collapse. Furthermore, French foreign policy during that period was focused 
on structuring a French-German axis, and on the European construction, which 
contributed to defense not being one of the governmental priorities.
3. THE POST-COLD WAR AND THE WHITE PAPER OF 1994
The end of the bipolar order meant the restructure of French security policy: the 
disappearance of the threat on which the defensive framework had been built, and the 
apparent global stability permitted the country to collect the dividend of peace, and to 
reduce the size, capabilities, and means of its army. 
The government of Edouard Balladur as Prime Minister, and François Mitterrand 
still as President of the Republic, presented a new White Paper on Defense in 1994 to 
10  National Assembly. Programme Law 83-606 of 8 July 1983 including approval of military programming 
for the years 1984-1988, París: Documentation Française. However, this law would be abolished in 1987 
with the approval of a new law for the period 1987-91.
11  LESPINOIS, op. cit., pp. 82-89.
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adapt the architecture of French security to the post-Cold War, and to set the bases for 
the defense of the country for the 21st century.12
Two types of national interests were recognized: the vital interests (territorial 
integrity, maritime and air accesses, free exercise of sovereignty, and the protection 
of the population), and the strategic ones (peace in Europe, the Mediterranean basin, 
and the Middle East; security of the energy supplies, and commercial imports and 
exports from outside Europe, responsibilities derived from the international position 
of France, especially as member of the United Nations Security Council).
To guarantee the international role of France, a European dimension of security 
and defense would be promoted through the revitalization of the Western European 
Union, and the support to initiatives such as the Euro corps or the creation of an 
aero-naval joint force among France, Spain, and Italy. The North Atlantic Alliance 
was considered an essential pillar of European security, and the achievement of the 
transatlantic bond; thus, assuming new responsibilities.  Nonetheless, the principles 
adopted in 1966 were still valid: non-integration in the military structure, free 
readiness of the armed forces, and the independence of nuclear power. Finally, the 
role of France in the United Nations pivoted around its membership in the Security 
Council, and the support to peacekeeping operations, as long as the latter would not 
come into conflict with national interests. 
Nuclear deterrence was considered essential to the vital interests and the political 
independence of the country, although it was recognized that in the years to come, its 
importance would have to decrease in national defense. Likewise, the Elysée Palace 
was willing to participate in the elaboration of a European nuclear doctrine as long as 
the full atomic autonomy of the country was kept.
Conventional forces needed an in-depth revision because the model inherited from 
the Cold War was obsolete. From then on, they should be prepared to prevent conflicts 
through cooperation and military assistance, and keeping the units pre-positioned; 
to attain technological, tactical, and doctrinal superiority, and to undertake a wide 
range of tasks, from support to peace to high intensity actions in a multinational 
environment, and the protection of the national territory, of its air space, and its 
accesses.
Six scenarios for the use of the armed forces were outlined, of different dimensions 
and different levels of military involvement:
•	 A regional conflict that would not affect France. The intervention would be 
carried out within a multinational framework, as a projection of power with 
advanced weaponry and special operational forces, or as a projection of forces, 
with ground units.
12  Ministry of Defense, White Paper of Defense 1994, París: Documentation Française, 1994.
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•	 A regional conflict where French interest would be threatened. France would 
use its conventional forces as well as its nuclear deterrence.
•	 An aggression against French overseas territories, to which Paris would respond 
regardless of the international reaction.
•	 The compliance with the defense treaties with countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In case of crisis, there would be a rapid and limited military response, but 
susceptible to being prolonged for months.
•	 Crisis management and imposition of peace. The participation would be 
carried out in a multinational environment and with clear objectives to avoid 
prolonging the mission or its spread to other territories.
•	 The resurgence of a threat against Western Europe. Although considered 
unlikely, but if it were to occur, France would respond with preemptive and 
nuclear deterrence measures.
The international atmosphere, the environment of risks and threats, and the 
national defense objectives should define the future capabilities of its armed forces, 
besides setting the bases of the Model for the Armed Forces 2015, which established the 
main guidelines for military programming.
Consistent with this forecast, three priority capabilities for the French armed forces 
were also established: Information, essential in the defense strategy, for the prevention 
of crises, and for the evaluation of potentially conflictive situations. The troops and the 
means of electronic observation, vigilance and reconnaissance would be increased; the 
Command, able to be projected and harmonized with allied systems, with a deployable 
General Staff and operational command; Projection, essential capability for all armed 
forces units, based on modular forces with lighter means and logistical requirements, 
and a fleet of strategic transport aircraft and projection ships.13
These approaches would determine the entity of the force. One or two ground 
brigades and one or two combat aircraft squadrons would be available for limited 
crises. For the enforcement of bilateral defense treaties, and for cases of aggression 
to the sovereign territory outside the metropolis, an airborne brigade and three 
fighter-bomber squadrons would be deployed. In case these three scenarios took 
place simultaneously, three land brigades, from three to six combat aircraft squadrons, 
ten in-flight refueling aircraft, and about sixty medium transport aircraft would 
13  This emphasis on the projection was due to the fact that the experience in the Gulf War 
was far from being satisfactory. Even though the Army had 290,000 troops, it could only deploy 
13,500 men, particularly because of the political cost it would have meant sending replacement 
soldiers. However, the serious lack of materiel in reconnaissance and transport means, or a notable 
insufficiency of capabilities of special operations, became evident. (MERCHET, Jean Dominique, 
“Les transformations de l’Armée française”, Hérodote, nº116, 2005, pp. 63-81).
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be available, in addition to an aircraft carrier and various landing means. To face a 
regional conflict, the pivot of military action would be the light-armored brigade that 
could be reinforced with a heavy-armored brigade, and air and aero-naval support. 
Should there be an aggression against Western Europe, France would rely on nuclear 
deterrence, and the use of all its entire conventional forces.
A mixed model of human resources based on universal conscription and a professional 
militia was defended. Mandatory military service was justified because a professional model 
could mean two restrictions: an insufficient number of volunteers to cover the staff, and a 
very high cost in detriment of expenditure for armament and materiel. On the contrary, a 
mixed model would allow the professionals to concentrate on projectable forces while the 
recruits would be assigned to support tasks, and to the units deployed in French territory. 
Nonetheless, this approach had an ephemeral life since, only two years later, in 1996, universal 
military service was abolished, which shows the lack of consistency with the approaches of 
the political authorities at the time.
Regarding the defense industry, the White Paper upheld the supervisory authority of 
the Ministry of Defense over the industrial sector, subordinating it to the defense strategy, 
and to the foreign objectives of the State. The insufficient capacity of the domestic market 
to absorb most of its own industrial production, the intensification of the competition in 
international markets, and the greater complexity of technology, and its increasing costs, 
rendered advisable the design of a new policy for industry, and for weaponry. In nuclear 
armament, France should maintain its technological self-sufficiency in delivery missiles, 
guidance systems, warheads, and means of command and control. Two objectives would be 
covered in conventional armament:  the preservation of the capability of its own design and 
manufacturing, and the commencement of cooperation programs with allied countries.14 
Regarding the budget framework, this road map placed a horizon of 2010 as a limit for its 
budget. Between 1965 and 1982, French military expenditures rose to 4% of GDP, and since 
then, a gradual decrease to 3.4% in 1994, which affected the objectives of power, the catalogs 
of capacities, and the plans of acquisition of weaponry and materiel.15 The White Paper ruled 
out the increase of defense expenditures, but argued for the need to increase the expenditures 
on weaponry, for the integration of new technologies as well as for the need to renew all 
the obsolete materiel. This modernization would require difficult decisions regarding several 
industrial sectors, as the purchases were suspended or cut back if they did not respond to the 
guidelines of the new model of armed forces to be shaped throughout the decade.16
14  CONZE, Henry. “France’s defense procurement strategy: looking to the future”, The RUSI 
Journal, vol. 140 nº 2, 1995, pp. 48-51.
15  AUFRANT, Marc. “France and its allies: A comparative study of defence spending trends since 
1985”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 10 nº1, 1999, pp. 79-102.
16  HÉBERT, Jean-Paul. The strategic debate about weaponry 1992-2005, Le Mesnil-sur-l’Estrée, 
CIRPES-Groupe de Sociologie de la Défense de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2006.
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It is also worth highlighting that this White Paper saw the light with the birth of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).17 In the nineties, the French armed forces were 
immersed in two parallel though interrelated processes: the debate and the integration 
of the RMA into French strategy, and the activation of the objectives established in 
the White Paper.18
The debate about the RMA in France crystallized with the elaboration of the first 
manual for joint doctrine, and the creation of forums for intellectual reflection and 
the analysis of lessons learned, for the elaboration of doctrinal documents, and the 
education of military commands.19 Some examples of this are the Center for Doctrine 
and Higher Education of the Army (1998), substituted in 2004 by the Center for 
Doctrine in the Use of Forces, and the Center for Higher Education of the Army; and 
in particular, the Joint Center for Concepts, Doctrines, and Experimentation which, 
founded in 2005, under the command of the Chief of Defense, constitutes the main 
organ of  the French military as it undertakes work for strategic prospective, joint 
doctrine, development and experimentation of concepts, or generation of military 
capabilities.20
Nonetheless, the French military did not limit themselves to importing American 
concepts about the RMA and transformation, but rather, regardless of the criterion, 
they elaborated their own original doctrines.21 In fact, the vision of the centers of 
thought regarding the binomial Revolution-Transformation has always been very 
17  An RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) constitutes a change in the form of combat which, 
motivated by the exploitation of new weapon systems, operating concepts, doctrines of use of force 
or ways to organize and administer military means, renders the former military style obsolete. In the 
decade of 1990, this idea designed the international strategic analysis since it was assumed that this 
revolution – made possible by information technology, based on the attainment of a full knowledge 
of the battlefield, and configured around the generation of a joint force capable of dominating the 
ground, naval, air, space, and cyberspace spheres – would allow the increase of the military gap 
between the countries that conquered it, and those which didn’t. (COLOM, Guillem, Entre Ares y 
Atenea, el debate sobre la Revolución en los Asuntos Militares, Madrid: Instituto Universitario General 
Gutiérrez Mellado, 2008).
18  PASCALON, Pierre. Quelle politique de défense pour la France à l’aube du XXIème siècle?, (What 
defense policy for France at the dawn of the 21st centruy?) Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001.
19  Army Staff, Concept interarmées d’emploi des forces en opération, París: Ministry of Defense, 1997 
Army Staff, Doctrine interarmées d’emploi des forces en opérations, Paris: Ministry of Defense, 2002.
20  Since its foundation, the Centro de Doctrina de Empleo de Fuerzas (CDEF) (Center for the 
Doctrine of the Use of the Forces) has been giving support to a wide and varied series of specialized 
publications: since  2003 Doctrine Tactique y Cahiers de la Recherche Doctrinale, in 2005 Héraclès y 
Cahiers de la Réflexion Doctrinale came out, and more recently, Cahiers de la Recherche Opérationnelle..
21  TERIFF, Terry, “NATO military transformation: challenges and opportunities for France”, 
European Security, vol. 19 nº 1, 2010, pp. 61-78.
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critical of the American model,22 considering it much too oriented to conventional war, 
and putting too much emphasis on the technological advantage as a decisive variable, 
which subordinates political action to military capacity, and coming from a strategic 
culture different from the European one.23 Consequently, France has questioned the 
convenience that its armed forces imitate the American forces.24
Along the same lines of self reflection, in 1997 the Ministry of Defense started the 
Prospective Plan for thirty years, to explore the future needs of the defense, and to orient 
studies in different fields.25 Starting from the strategic environment, the crises and 
deployment scenarios of the French armed forces, the evolution of military technology, 
the current and future capacities (network operations, deterrence, command, control 
and communications, observation, reconnaissance, projection and mobility, in-depth 
attacks, air-ground or air-sea, and aerospace capacity), and established a catalog of 
risks and threats foreseen, and of detailed proposals for equipment and materials.
Despite these efforts for intellectual reflection and for doctrinal elaboration, and 
the objectives presented in the White Paper of 1994, the capabilities of the armed forces 
of the country continued to erode, in particular those of the Army.  The abolition of 
compulsory military service without having forecasts based on a professional army led 
many units to be below adequate staffing levels, reducing its operating capacity. In 
addition, the divisional structure was replaced by another structure based on brigades 
without analyzing its operating implications, and numerous regiments were eliminated 
without clear criteria, ignoring seniority or the personnel record.  The territorial 
distribution of the units integrated in the brigades was characterized by its territorial 
dispersion, reducing internal cohesion, and complicating the command’s tasks.  The 
reduction of training due to the decrease in the frequency of the maneuvers, the 
lack of ammunition for training, and the obsolescence of numerous weapons systems, 
which reduced the rate of readiness of ground, naval, and air means, also contributed 
to diminish operating capacity from the armed forces.26
22  The then Chief of the CDEF, General Vincent Desportes, made it perfectly clear in an interview: 
“La Transformation en difficulté: vers l’adaptation, nouveau paradigme?” (“The transformation in 
difficulty: towards adaptation, a new paradigm?) Défense et Sécurité Internationale, nº 20, 2006, pp. 
15-21.
23  For a detailed and critical analysis about “technologism” of American military thought, see: La 
technologie militaire en question. Le cas américain. Paris: Economica, 2008.
24  Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, “La «Transformation»: jusqu’où?”,(The “Transformation”, 
how far?”) Héraclès, nº 4, 2004, pp. 16-18. 
25  Ministry of Defense, The prospective plan for 30 years, París: Ministry of Defense, 2005.
26  BOYER, Yves. Organization of the French armed forces. National  Army, Air Force, and Navy. 
Major structures, implementations, units and equipment, París: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 
2002.
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Nonetheless, the enactment of the Military Programme Law 2003-2008 tried to 
stem the loss of military capacities.27 After many years of budget reductions, the law 
presented an increase in expenditures and investments, particularly in weapons and 
materiel:  nuclear deterrence means, air and sea transport, antimissile defense, and 
defense in space, and means of in-depth attacks. In other words, Paris intended to 
reinforce its decision-making autonomy by modernizing the arsenal and capabilities 
of its forces28.
The experience acquired in international missions (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Ivory 
Coast, Congo, Iraq or Lebanon) produced valuable insights, in particular to the Army. 
Among other lessons learned, it was observed that the ground units should not be so 
specialized since they were required multi-functional capabilities on site (armed action, 
stabilization or humanitarian aid);29 capabilities for urban combat were developed, 
and medium armored forces were boosted in detriment of those for heavy forces, and 
the operating cycles abroad were revised.30
4. A NEW CHANGE OF DIRECTION IN FRENCH DEFENSE: THE 
WHITE PAPER OF 2008
The publication of the White Paper of National Defense and Security of 2008 
substantially altered the guidelines drawn up in previous years.31 In its Preface, President 
Nicolas Sarkozy spoke of the need to boost a national security strategy that would 
include the defense, domestic security, foreign and economic policies, and that would 
provide France the necessary means to count on freedom of action and decision-
making autonomy.32
27  Assemblée Nationale. LOI n° 2003-73 of 27 January 2003 regarding military programming for 
the years 2003 to 2008, París: Documentation Française, 2003.
28  BOURDILLAU, François. “Evolutions de l’Armée de l’Air vers le modèle Air 2015”,(“Evolutions 
of the Air Force towards the model Air 2015”) in PASCALON, Pierre (dir.). Les armées françaises à 
l’aube du XXI siècle -L’Armée de l’Air (The French armed forces at the dawn of the 21st century- the Air 
Force), Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003, pp. 241-259.
29  Ministry of Defense. The prospective plan in 30 years. Syntheses and Annexes, Paris: Ministry of 
Defense, 2005.
30  KLEIN, Michel. Armée de Terre: armée d’emploi,(The Army: a professional force). Paris: 
Foundation for Strategic Research, 2007.
31   Ministry of Defense. National Defense and Security. White Paper 2008, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008.
32  ARTEAGA, Félix. “The concept of national security in the White Paper of French National 
Defense and Security”, Analysis of the Royal Elcano Institute, nº 133, 2008.
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Positive elements were enumerated in the international scenario, such as the spread 
of democracy throughout the world, the reduction of poverty, greater international 
cooperation, and the decrease of war conflicts; but the negative elements were also 
mentioned, such as the increase in sources of instability which escaped the control of 
the States, the expansion of territories that remain on the margins of globalization; 
the environmental deterioration; the tensions for the provisioning of material of 
strategic interest, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missiles. 
Underlined as well was the evolution of the forms of violence, with a quantitative 
and qualitative leap of terrorism,33 of the proliferation of irregular and asymmetric 
conflicts, and of the growing privatization of violence.34 
Although Western technological and military supremacy were recognized, with the 
US at the center, a warning was also given about the progressive loss of the Western 
demographic and economic weight, and the violent answer to its cultural values. The 
preoccupation for the Asian situation was obvious, with the strength of China and 
India, and the absence of a collective security system in the area. As a whole, it was 
not considered that the post Cold War world was more dangerous than the previous 
bipolar order, but in fact, more unstable and less foreseeable, which could require 
more foreign interventions.
Regarding the most important risks and threats for France, the White Paper defined 
them in their connection with specific geographic areas, a new notion in relation with 
previous documents. The first was the arc of instability that stretches from the African 
Atlantic coast to the Indian Ocean, with risks as heterogenous as the rivalry between 
Sunnis and Shiites, jihadism, State fragility, conflicts due to access to resources, and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Despite its natural resources, and 
its development potential, sub-Saharan Africa was still burdened by high population 
growth, food shortage, and the combination of corrupt governments and unresolved 
conflicts, turning it into another source of risks. In the third place, the Maghreb, 
due to its potential destabilization because of demographic pressure, uncontrolled 
emigration, political conflicts, and jihadist activity. In the case of Asia, the main worry 
lay in the possible conflicts among three States with common borders and having 
nuclear devices: China, India, and Pakistan. 
The risks that could hover over France, and over Europe, would include terrorism 
(conventional or with weapons of mass destruction); attacks with ballistic and cruise 
missiles; cyber attacks; transnational criminal activities; pandemics (spread through 
33  The terrorist threat had already been specifically discussed in a previous document. Prime 
Minister, France in the face of terrorism. White Paper of the Government regarding domestic security in 
the face of terrorism. Paris: Documentation Française, 2006.
34  In this respect, see the similarities of these approaches with the prospective analysis that the 
Ministry of Defense published a year earlier. Ministry of Defense, Preparing future commitments for 
2035, París: Ministry of Defense, 2007.
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the international mobility of people and merchandise); effects of climate change; 
natural and industrial catastrophes, or aggressions to French citizens abroad. As a 
whole, these analytic variables provided a much more ample and varied strategic vision 
than in any previous official document, but precisely that breadth of focus tended to 
diffuse the precise role that the armed forces should carry out in the new strategy. The 
military instrument was left out regarding some of the threats, which would be more 
the responsibility of public health or civil protection services than of the armed forces. 
hus, defense became another instrument in the framework of the security policies 
designed by the government.
Consequently, the new national security strategy established that the aim of defense 
was to guarantee the integrity of the population, the territory, and the republican 
values, and to contribute to European and International security. The instruments to 
guarantee these aims would be the defense policy, the internal and civil security policy, 
foreign policy, and economic action.35 The White Paper established a set of strategic 
functions as the bases for foreign, security and defense actions:
•	 Knowledge and anticipation, with the preparation of the means for defense and 
security, reinforcing the intelligence services, and creating a National Defense 
and Security Council with the participation of all ministries involved in security.
•	 Prevention, through the improvement of the collective security system to reduce 
the risks and peacefully solve international controversies during the crises and 
post conflicts, cooperating with the work of stabilization and reconstruction. 
Disarmament, preventive diplomacy, integration of security in the aid to 
development policies, follow-up of fragile situations, or the reinforcement of 
the local capacities of crises prevention.
•	 Deterrence, of a nuclear nature, and conceived as the last guarantee for the 
integrity of the territory, the population, and the institutions of the country. 
It would be built on four missile-launching submarines and two squadrons of 
attack aircraft based on land and on board.  Likewise, the necessary scientific, 
technological, and industrial resources needed to support and modernize the 
nuclear capacity would be kept.
•	 Protection, with the aim of neutralizing attacks against the territory and the 
population; coordinating the internal security, civil protection, and the armed 
35  Furthermore, , this strategy would be based on anticipation and reaction, or the capability 
to operate on strategic surprises (unforeseen events that alter world security), and on strategic 
ruptures (events that radically modify the security of the States), in a  preventive manner, and, in 
any event, modifying its evolution;  resistance or the capability of public powers  and society to 
face the consequences of a catastrophe or of an aggression, restoring as soon as  possible normal life, 
and the escalation of  power, understood as the capacity to respond to each situation with flexibility, 
depending on the entity of the threat and its evolution.
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forces; modernizing aero-spatial surveillance; and strengthening the capability 
to react of the public powers.
•	 Intervention, autonomously in case of threats to French citizens living abroad, 
since in all other cases, the interventions would take place in a multinational 
framework. The intervention would concentrate on three geographical axes: 
Atlantic Ocean-Gulf of Oman-Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea-Western 
Africa-the Antilles, and sub-Saharan Africa, with the pre-positioning of the 
forces on the African-Atlantic front, in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, and in the 
Indian Ocean.
The document also set forth the military capabilities, and the entity of the armed 
forces, which should be able to carry out the following tasks:  to project 30,000 troops 
in a period of six months, and give them support during one year, simultaneously 
keeping 5,000 soldiers on alert for other missions. The spearhead of the air force 
would be the Mirage 2000 and the Rafale combat aircraft, being able to project up 
to seventy units –at a high performance rate in the coercive phase, and backed up in 
the stabilization phase– at distances of up to 8,000 kilometers from French territory. 
The Navy should be in proper conditions to deploy an aero-naval group -made up of 
an aircraft carrier, escort frigates, and nuclear attack submarines- and an amphibious 
group.
According to the road map, these force objectives will be reached between 2015 and 
2025. The effort of the equipment would focus on the improvement of the protection 
of the force (armored, personal equipment, counter IED systems, NBQR (nuclear 
biochemical) defense, and electronic war); correct maintenance of the ammunition 
reserves; strengthening programs with direct impact on operational coherence (such as 
the amphibious capacity); cyber war; strategic and tactical air transport; modernization 
of tactical air support; the control of the submarine environment and of the coastal 
waters; the increase of  attack systems at a distance (submarine and air launched cruise 
missiles); or the capacity to undertake network operations.36
The document outlined a force detailing that the Army would have 88,000 
projectable troops, organized into twelve brigades with their support units; the Navy 
would have an aircraft carrier, eighteen frigates, four amphibious assault ships, six 
nuclear attack submarines, and four missile-launching submarines; and the Air Force 
would keep three hundred combat aircraft, fourteen refueling aircraft, and seventy 
strategic and tactical transport aircraft.
Likewise, the document stated that French foreign and security action would be 
integrated in the international security structures. In this sense, Paris bet on giving 
36  Ministry of Defense. Modernization of Defense. For an advance Defense, París: Ministry of 
Defense 2008.
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an impulse to the Common Policy for Defense and Security, codified in the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007-9) with the organization of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
the creation of a joint Operational General Headquarters, the reinforcement of the 
interoperability of the European armies, the collaboration in intelligence, the creation 
of a competitive defense industry in the international market, and the establishment 
of a single and integrated command for European civil and military operations.
The traditional French ambivalence was maintained regarding the North Atlantic 
Alliance. On the one hand, it underlined the importance for the country of the 
cooperation between the EU and NATO, of the role of the Alliance to address new 
threats, and of a new balance between the United States and the European partners, 
in favor of the latter. But, even though the French collaboration with NATO has 
increased, particularly after its integration in the military structure and the attainment 
of the leadership of one of the two strategic commands, the Transformation Allied 
Command, Paris continued being outside allied organizations such as the Defense 
Planning Committee, or the Nuclear Planning Group, to keep its decision-making 
autonomy.37
The change in the nuclear doctrine and in the entity of the force de frappe was 
highly important. Since the White Paper of 1972, the first to define the doctrine of 
the use of its nuclear power, its content had suffered no significant changes: deter 
a potential aggressor, defend the vital interests of France -even though they were 
never defined with sufficient clarity- and maintain its technological self sufficiency 
of weapons as well as of its launch missiles. Nonetheless, since its origins, the French 
nuclear doctrine presented a special characteristic which made it different from the 
Anglo Saxon doctrine: the preparation for a first strike, ruling out a flexible response 
or escalation. The French authorities gave nuclear weapons the role of last defense 
barrier; but, if the need arose, they ruled out gradualism, and affirmed their readiness 
for a decisive attack. 
Neither was it ever specified what type of objectives (military, industrial, population 
areas, etc.) would be attacked nor with what priority, thus making uncertainty an 
integrating element of the deterrent capability.38
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, when France began to bet on nuclear 
disarmament more decisively than previously, reducing the number of atomic 
warheads, and decreasing the budget allocated to these devices.  In 1996, it committed 
to suspending nuclear tests, to dismantling its installations for the production of 
fissile material, to eliminate its nuclear land capacity, to reduce one third of its fleet 
37  PESME, Fréderic. “France’s return to NATO, implications for its defence policy”, European 
Security, vol. 19, nº 1, 2010, pp. 45-60.
38  ARTEAGA, Félix. “French nuclear deterrence according to President Chirac: reform, rupture or 
a reminder?” Analysis of the  Real Instituto Elcano, nº 11, 2006.
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of missile-launching submarines and, since 2008, to reduce its nuclear missiles by 
33%, and its nuclear warheads by 50% relative to the number in 1991.39 In 1997, the 
fixed nuclear targets were deprogrammed, and the policy of selection of objectives 
toward any potential aggressor with nuclear weapons was reoriented, regardless of 
their entity. In 2001, under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, it was announced that 
the French nuclear capacity could also be directed against regional powers and states 
that developed or had weapons of mass destruction, and not only nuclear capacity. 
In 2006, a new change was introduced by including, among the reasons that would 
justify a nuclear attack, the defense of strategic supplies for the survival of France and 
the defense of allied countries.40 In conclusion, the doctrine of the use of the force de 
frappe came close to the Anglo Saxon postulates, despite the fact that Paris still keeps 
the political and strategic independence of France in resorting to nuclear weapons.41
In spite of that, it is necessary to highlight that these reductions have gone along 
with the modernization of missiles as well as of available nuclear weapons. Since 2010, 
M45 submarine launched ballistic missiles are being replaced by the new M51, with 
longer range and greater precision. The air missiles are also being modernized: since 
2009, its Mirage 2000N aircraft are being substituted by the new Rafale F3, and the 
ASMP air-to-ground missiles are being replaced by the more modern ASMP-A, of 
longer range, greater stealth, and a broader array of flight paths. Thus, it seems obvious 
that the French governments, regardless of the political color, and the public debate 
about the cost of the nuclear arsenal, are not willing to relinquish nuclear weapons or 
to limit its capability of attack, understanding deterrence as the fundamental pillar of 
the survival of France as a relevant power in the international scenario.
In relation with conventional capabilities, since 1996, with the abolition of the universal 
military service, and in spite of the recruitment of professional volunteers, the reduction of 
troops had continued in subsequent years. The decrease of the troops came with the adaptation 
of the organization and operation structure: between 1996 and 2007, fifty regiments, ten 
General Staffs, and over two hundred organisms of different nature were eliminated from the 
organization chart of the Army.42
39  These decisions would take place after a strong public debate about the deterrence capability of 
France. In this regard, see the numerous contributions included in PASCALON, Pierre and PARIS, 
Henry (dirs.). French nuclear deterrence in question(s). Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006. On the other hand, a 
synthesis of these reductions can be found in: Commission for National and Armed Forces Defense. 
Rapport d’information relatif à une revue capacitaire des armées. París: Assemblé Nationale, 2014.
40  DEBOUZY, Olivier. “French nuclear deterrence doctrine: an aggiornamento”. European Affairs, 
vol. 7, nº 1, pp. 1-22.
41  TETRAIS, Bruno. A comparison between US, UK and French nuclear policies and doctrines, París: 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2007.
42  The 53 active duty infantry regiments in 1996 ended up being 20 in 2010; in the same time 
period, the cavalry and armored brigades went from 25 to 12; artillery from 28 to 12; engineers from 
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The proposals in the White Paper of 2008 were not exempt from severe criticisms, especially 
from within the military. The self-denominated Grupo Surcouf made its evaluation public in 
an article in the French press,43 of which some issues are worth mentioning: a direct criticism 
of the French defense industry, which was accused of imposing its interests above the needs 
of the armed forces, with technologically well advanced but very costly equipment, which 
did not satisfy the operating requirements, and mortgaged the finances of the Ministry of 
Defense; a strategic evaluation which did not prioritize among the different threats, and the 
excess of military interventions abroad which, carried out without clear criteria, caused an 
excessive burnout of the troops and of the materiel, and undermined the training. 
Nonetheless, the forecasts in this White Paper had an ephemeral lifespan. A few months 
after its presentation, and within a context marked by the economic crisis that lay ahead for 
the country, the Elysée Palace started the General Revision of Public Policies to rationalize and 
reduce the French public administration decreasing public expenditures. In the Ministry of 
Defense, its implementation made the attainment of the expense objectives detailed in the 
Military Programme Law 2009-14 impossible, since from the 377 billion Euros initially forecast, 
they were revised down to 340 billion Euros, negatively affecting the plans to modernize 
weapons and materiel.
The application of this revision was also evaluated severely by the analysts and the military 
in charge. Among the arguments highlighted was that the reduction of troops -particularly in 
the Army- did not conform with the objectives of presence and intervention abroad outlined 
in the White Paper; that the outsourcing of maintenance to private companies was too costly 
for the available budgets; that the primacy of the civil servants pushed the military to the role 
of secondary technicians, or that the costly nuclear arsenal was irrelevant to face the current 
or foreseeable conflicts.44
From an official position, such as the one embodied by the National and Armed 
Forces Defense Commission of the National Assembly, the implications of the failure 
to comply with the budget allocations of the Military Programme Law (2009-2014)45 
have been analyzed in detail. The balance between the objectives set in 2008, and its 
compliance in 2013 was considered satisfactory only in the fields of nuclear deterrence 
and cyber defense. In the area of land weaponry, even though the acquisition of high 
technology materials (Felin individual equipment, Caesar self-propelled artillery, Tiger 
19 to 7; and communications from 17 to 5.
43  Groupe Surcouf: “Livre Blanc sur la défense: une espérance déçue”, (White Paper on defense: a 
disappointing hope”)Le Figaro, 19 June 2008. The authorship of the article was attributed to General 
Vicent Desportes, at that time Director of the Centro Interejércitos de Defensa.
44  THOMANN, Jean-Claude. “Threat to our military capability”, Le Monde, 13 May 2008  o 
BRANCA, Eric. “Where is the French Army going?”, Le Spectacle du Monde, February 2011.
45  National Assembly. Law nº 2009-928 of 29 July regarding military programme for the years 2009 to 
2014 and including several dispositions concerning defense, París: Documentation Française.
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attack helicopters, or VBCI infantry armored vehicles), had been increased, the pace 
of its deliveries had also been delayed, not complying with the deadlines forecast. 
Furthermore, the oldest equipment (trucks, VAB, AMX-10RC, and ERC-90 armored 
vehicles) could not be substituted, due to the growing and serious delay of the Scorpion, 
VBL, and PPT programs. 
In the case of naval weaponry, even though decreasing the number of FREEM frigates, 
from seventeen units initially foreseen to only eleven, the compliance of the delivery 
dates of the first units and of the Horizon frigates, projection ships, and the naval 
version of the Rafale was confirmed, while simultaneously ratifying the cancellation of 
the second aircraft carrier, the excessive delay of the start of operations of the NH-90 
helicopters, and warning of the fragile  situation of maritime surveillance, due to the 
loss of means and capabilities. 
In the aeronautic sphere, meeting the delivery dates and the amounts foreseen of 
the Rafale aircraft, and of the SCALP missiles was positively evaluated, but attention 
was drawn to the suspension of the modernization of the Mirage 2000D and, especially, 
to the serious deterioration of the capacity of air transport, with the delays of the 
A-400M, and the ageing of the C-160 and C-130 fleet. In fact, the report called the 
capability of air-mobility of the armed forces a “black mark”. 
Furthermore, the failure of the program of acquisition of drones, and the dependence 
on American models was defined as a very significant flaw, due to the operating and 
information rights they entail.46
5. FRENCH DEFENSE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE WHITE 
PAPER OF 2013 
In July, 2012, President François Hollande commissioned a new revision of defense 
to a committee presided by Jean-Marie Guéhenno. The initiative was officially due 
to the changes in the world strategic situation, with the increase of international 
terrorism, and to the economic events in recent years. The result would be the White 
Paper of 2013.47 
In its presentation, leaving aside the justifying rhetoric about the need of a revised 
outlook of the world, and of the risks and threats for France and for Europe, the 
46  Commission for National and Armed Forces Defense. Information report about the control of the 
execution of defense credits for year 2013, París:National Assembly, and Information report regarding a 
capabilities review of the armed forces. París: National Assembly.
47  Ministry of Defense. White Paper. National Defense and Security 2013, París: Ministry of Defense..
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admission of the weakness of public finances and the pressure to preserve the essential 
elements of defense to guarantee its sustainability is very significant.48
In strategic approaches, evaluation of risks or defensive priorities, the document is 
continuous with respect to the White Paper of 2008, except for two outstanding new 
features. The first one consists of the attempt to resolve the growing breach between 
the persistence of the risks and threats with the reduction of the resources to address 
them in the budget of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the government foresees keeping 
constant the expenditures for the period 2014-2019, and increasing it slightly beginning 
in 2020. Therefore, it admits that the pace of equipping and modernizing will be slower 
than initially planned in 2008, but the modernization of the critical material for the 
three priority functions must be guaranteed: deterrence, information, and projection 
of strength.  A new multi-functional army model, featuring the concentration of 
forces, must be adjusted to the new scenario.  Last, France will rely on re-launching 
European defense, and on its presence in the North Atlantic Alliance.49
The second new feature is in the military strategy which has a very relevant change 
with respect to the previous White Papers, as it abandons the hypothesis of a possible 
high-intensity confrontation in favor of two scenarios:  coercion operations and crisis 
management operations. The emphasis placed on the “mutualization” of defense, 
understood as the multi-faceting of high technology materiel within the French 
armed forces should be highlighted, and as the collaboration within the European 
framework in operational capabilities such as transport, in-flight refueling, naval 
aviation resources, satellites, or drones.  These changes probably can only be explained 
with the reduction of defense expenditures, which makes scenarios of greater entity 
unfeasible, and puts limits on the capability of the country to independently acquire 
high-technology equipment, at a very high cost.
The new model for the armed forces should be capable of assuming three types of 
operations:  the protection of the territory and the population through the deployment 
of up to 10,000 land forces; the participation in multinational crisis management 
operations, with a maximum of 7,000 troops, a naval group around a projection ship, 
and twelve combat aircraft; and an operation of coercion that would need up to 15,000 
land troops, forty five combat aircraft, and a naval aviation group.
The size of forces needed to carry out these missions would be, in the case of the 
Army, 66,000 troops comprising seven brigades (two heavy ones of coercion, three 
48  GUIBERT, Bathalie. “White Paper of Defense. France prepares the wars of tomorrow with its 
ambitions reduced.”, Le Monde, 29 April 2013.
49  An interesting analysis in this respect can be found in: LASCONJARIAS, Guillaume. “Rentrée 
dans le rang? France, NATO and the EU, from the Védrine report to the 2013 French White Paper on 
national security and defence”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 12, nº 4, 2014, pp. 418-431.
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multi-faceted medium ones for stabilization, and two light ones for intervention),50 plus 
three more for support (one for information, one for communications, and another 
one for support to the command, logistics, and transportation). The naval forces 
should include an aircraft carrier, six attack submarines, three projection amphibious 
ships, and fifteen frigates, in addition to patrol ships, anti-mine war equipment, and 
maritime patrol planes. As far as the air force, the plan is for two hundred and twenty 
five combat aircraft, fifty for tactical transport, twelve for in-flight refueling, twelve 
strategic drones, and seven surveillance aircraft. Furthermore, the special operation 
forces, the cybernetic capabilities, and the observation, reconnaissance, and aerospace 
surveillance will be enhanced.
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014.
The new Military Programme Law (2014-19), which details the capabilities of the 
new model for the armed forces, the equipment of material and the budget allocations 
to reach its objective,51 was passed in December 2013. For the period of 2014-16, defense 
expenditures are expected to stabilize at 31.38 billion Euros yearly at current prices; 
while, beginning in 2017, a mild increase up to 31.78 billion Euros in 2018, and 32.51 
billion Euros in 2019. As moderate as inflation may be during the coming years, it is 
obvious that we may in fact be discussing a freeze as budget objective, although not 
explicitly expressed (Graph 1). From this total of 190 billion Euros, 54.5% will go to 
50  The so-called “coercion” brigades correspond to armored brigades; the multi-faceted ones are 
infantry brigades of armored vehicles on wheels, and of the light type, one is air transported, and the 
other for mountains.
51  National Assembly. Law nº 2013-1168 of 18 December  2013 regarding military program for the years 
2014 à 2019 and including several dispositions regarding national defense and security, 2013.
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equipment, which at the same time will be distributed into 47.5% in weaponry and 
conventional equipment, 19.9% to training material, 5.9% to infrastructure, 4.2% to 
future plans, and 22.5% to nuclear deterrence.
There is no doubt that the contents of the White Paper 2013 as well as those of the 
Military Programme Law do no more than consolidate the tendency initiated with the 
General Revision of Public Policies; in other words, a progressive but sustained reduction 
of the size of the French armed forces, which affects all areas of defense: personnel, 
weaponry and materiel, infrastructure, training, modernization plans, etc. The official 
rhetoric that impregnates these documents cannot hide that this endless process of 
budget restrictions leads to the inevitable reduction of the operating capabilities of 
the three services.52 If until 2008, the forecast regarding the projection of the armed 
forces mentioned up to 50,000 troops, and one hundred combat aircraft, in the White 
Paper 2008 the objectives were reduced to 30,000, and seventy, respectively, and in the 
White Paper 2013, limits them to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and forty five combat 
aircraft.53 The reduction of the total military troops has gone in the same direction: 
f in 2009, it was 240,966 men and women that served in the French armed forces, 
in 2014, they were 215,019, and new cut backs are foreseen until 2019. Furthermore, 
lowering the defense budget is a trend that comes from long ago. As Graph 2 shows, 
the gradual loss of weight of military expenditure with respect to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has been taking place since the last years of the Cold War, becoming 
steeper since 1995, except for a slight upturn in 2009. In other words, even in periods 
of prosperity for public finances, the Ministry of Defense has gradually become one 
of the “less wealthy cousins” of the French administration. Although it is true that the 
evolution of French defense expenditures is coherent with the persistent collection of 
the “peace dividend” linked to the end of the Cold War, and it can be framed into 
a generalized movement among Western countries in the same direction (see Graph 
2), the growing imbalance among the traditional aspirations of all the residents of the 
Elysée Palace to carry out the role of major power and the allocation of resources to its 
armed forces cannot be avoided. 
52  In May 2014, President Manuel Valls announced a new budget cut back of 50 billion Euros 
for the whole public administration; the Ministry of Defense should assume a reduction of between 
3,000 and 6,000 million between 2014 and 2017, so that instead of the initial freezing initially planned 
in the Military Programme Law 2014-2019, there would be a reduction (BARLUET, Alain. “Les 
armées craignet un bugdet amputé”, Le Figaro, 15 May 2014).
53   FOUCHET, Antoine. “Interview with General Vincent Desportes”, La Croix, May 2013.
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Source: Author’s elaboration using the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014. The data about Italy for 
2007-2012 are estimates.
In this sense, it is not strange that military high commanders have emphasized the 
serious problems that these successive financial cut backs are creating. In fact, in the 
last annual report of the Army, the Army General Jean-Marie Faugère, who writes the 
prologue to the document, highlights that since the publication of the White Book of 
2013, the predominance of the short-term analysis is impeding the long-term planning 
of the Army model; he questions an outlook of risks and threats that goes no further 
than the generalities, and that, behind the rhetoric of “adaptation to capabilities”, 
hides a “reduction of capabilities”. The same document includes the testimony of the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Jean-Pierre Bosser, in the National Assembly, where he 
warns that the Army alone should mobilize 22,000 troops in operational cycles of four 
months, of which 8,000 are for foreign deployment, 6,300 are located outside the 
metropolitan territory, and another 8,000 are ready to be deployed in the metropolitan 
territory itself,54 which means a notable burnout of all the units involved. He also 
insists on the urgent need of resources for training, enlisting, and maintenance of 
materiel, besides drawing attention to the urgency of the Scorpion program, and of 
the tactical drones, which should be considered priority.55 Although many of these 
54  It must be taken into account that, regardless of the interventions abroad, France has 7,200 
soldiers deployed in the extra-metropolitan sovereignty territories. ( the Antilles, Guayana, Reunion, 
New Caledonia and Polynesia) (Ministry of Defense. Les chiffres clés de la Défese, París: DICOD, 2014).
55   Ministry of Defense, Grand Rapport de l’Armée de Terre 2014, París: État-Major de l’Armée de 
Terre, 2014.
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warnings were validated by the French armed forces during Operation Serval in Mali 
(2013-14), it was necessary to wait until the jihadist attack against the satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in January of 2015, and the emergency deployment of 10,000 troops 
to metropolitan territory for the Elysée Palace to reconsider its decisions. Last May, 
President Holland showed his determination to increase the military expenditure 
to guarantee the security of the country against international terrorism56; and two 
months later, the legislative power passed an update of the Military Programme Law 
(2015-19)57 which included an increase of 3.8 billion Euros in war expenditure for the 
period of 2016-19.  With this additional sum, Paris intends to have a permanent force 
of 7,000 troops for the security of the French territory, increase the ground maneuver 
force from 66,000 to 77,0000 soldiers, pay the operations in Africa, the Middle East, 
or the Sahel, protect 18,500 jobs in the Ministry of Defense, of the 34,000 that were 
initially intended to amortize, and finance the purchase of new equipment (seven 
Tiger helicopters and six NH-90, refueling aircraft A-330 MRTT, a new B2M corvette, 
or laser designation equipment), or the modernization of the existing ones (drones, 
aircraft, or frigates). It remains to be seen if these emergency measures will be effective, 
or if the Elysée Palace will be able to reduce the huge breach that exists between the 
national defense objectives, and the means allocated to achieve them. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the trauma from the Second World War –or precisely because of it– the 
subsequent French governments have opted to continue boosting a powerful foreign 
policy. In spite of the configuration of the bipolar world, France was able to reach 
and retain its relevant position in the international sphere of the Cold War. The Suez 
failure acted as a sharp shock to promote and consolidate a new design of its power 
policy, based on independence from a policy of blocs, the possession of a nuclear 
arsenal of its own, and the maintenance of a large capacity of foreign intervention to 
guarantee its role as the gendarme of French-speaking Africa.
Consistent with this persisting ambition, the French armed forces have experimented 
consecutive transformations since 1945: first, the specialization in colonial wars 
(Indochina and Algeria); next, the adaptation to the bipolar world, and the capacity 
to repel – in cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in spite of its exit from the 
56  HOROBIN, William. “France to Increase Military Spending to Counter Terror Threat”, Wall 
Street Journal, 29 April 2015.
57  National Assembly. Law n° 2015-917 of 28 July 2015 updating the military programme for 
the years 2015 à 2019 and including several dispositions regarding defense, París: Documentation 
Française, 2015.
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integrated military structure of the sixties – a hypothetical invasion of Western Europe 
and, since the end of the Cold War, a deep reform of its entity and organization, along 
with the incorporation of military capabilities linked to the Revolution of Military 
Affairs, and of a growing projection abroad. In this sense, it is interesting to highlight 
that the French strategic culture has repeatedly shown its independence of thought 
and of doctrinal elaboration, to the point that it can be affirmed that the French 
armed forces are the most autonomous in this area of all those integrated in the 
allied and the European frameworks. Likewise, this French uniqueness also rests on a 
technological and industrial capability in many defense sectors which is incomparable 
in Europe. France is politically, strategically, and militarily autonomous because it 
has an industrial structure that allows it, as its stance in the allied and European 
frameworks repeatedly reveal.  In this sense, for a mid-size power such as Spain, the 
lessons from our neighbor should be a source of study and inspiration, more so if 
we consider that our axis of security is not in the North of the continent but in the 
Mediterranean area, in the north of Africa, and in the Sahel.
Nonetheless, not all are good news for French defense. The peace dividend linked 
to the end of the Cold War considerably reduced military expenditure, and opened 
a breach between the strategic objectives, and the means to satisfy them, which have 
only grown. Even though the White Paper of 2008 tried to renew the pillars of French 
national defense, the economic crisis that was looming ended up jeopardizing its 
execution and forced it to draw up a new road map. Conditioned by the financial 
situation of the country, the White Paper of 2013 –and the Military Programme 
Law that went along with it– continued with the unstoppable reduction of the size 
and capabilities of the French armed forces, and deepened the breach between the 
traditional aspirations of the Elysée Palace to perform the role of major power, and the 
allocation of resources to its armed forces.
In spite of the innumerable warnings regarding the erosion of the military 
capabilities of the country, it was necessary to wait until the events of Charlie Hebdo 
last January for France to redefine its decisions. The prominence given to the budget 
adjustments over any other strategic consideration, and the effects of the economic 
crisis on the finances of the country made it difficult to imagine a different scenario. 
Nonetheless, these terrorist attacks have mediated so France modified the Military 
Programme Law, increased the defense expenditure, increased the size of land forces, 
and showed determination to combat international terrorism with weapons.
Although this change of trend is very significant, in real terms this increase in the 
budget of 3.8 billion Euros for the next three years is estimated to be insufficient, as 
the Gaullist opposition warned. Perhaps, if important international events of great 
impact took place –a generalized conflict in Europe (something that the White Paper 
of 2013 rules out based on Russian assertiveness, or a systemic crisis in the north of 
Africa– and they were perceived as a direct threat to the security of France, and of 
its most vital interests, a significant increase in French military expenditure could be 
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considered. Even in this case, the recovery of the capabilities lost or eroded throughout 
all these years would demand not only additional resources but, especially, time. And 
time management in the field of defense and security is not always within the reach of 
governments and political cycles.
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